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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the jury err in finding that Seller performed all 
steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract? 
Standard of Reviews A jury finding will be reversed on 
appeal only if "the evidence to support the [jury's] 
verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable 
and unjust." Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P. 2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1982) . 
Issue Preserved: Motion for New Trial (Record 
[hereafter, "R."] 1146-1147.) 
2. Did the jury err in finding that Buyer's filing of a 
notice of interest violated the Wrongful Lien statute? 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue #1. 
Issue Preserved: Same as Issue #1. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. § 38-9-1, Liability of Person Filing Wrongful Lien: 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or 
encumbrance against, real property, who causes or has 
caused a document asserting that claim to be recorded or 
filed in the office of the county recorder, who knows or 
has reason to know that the document is forged, 
groundless, or contains a material misstatement or false 
claim, is liable to the owner or title-holder for $1,000 
or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees, and costs as proved in this 
chapter, if he willfully refuses to release or correct 
such document of record within 20 days from the date of 
written request from the owner or beneficial title-holder 
of the real property. This chapter is not intended to be 
applicable to mechanics7 or materialmen's liens. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a contract dispute between the Seller and Buyer of 16 
acres of undeveloped land in Sandy, Utah. When appellant 
Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buyer") did not make a payment 
due under the purchase contract, appellee Don Siggard and Glenna F. 
Siggard Family Trust ("Seller") sought to forfeit Buyer7s interest 
by sending a notice of default and, 28 days later, a notice of 
forfeiture. 
Buyer is appealing because the notice of forfeiture was two 
days premature. Pursuant to the purchase contract, Buyer should 
have been given 30 days after it received notice of default to 
cure. Although Seller was immediately made aware that the notice 
of forfeiture was premature, Seller has never given Buyer any 
additional time in which to make the required payment. 
Buyer seeks a ruling that because the notice of forfeiture was 
two days premature, Seller failed to terminate Buyer's rights under 
the contract. Buyer also seeks a ruling from this Court that by 
filing a notice of interest against the property, Buyer did not 
violate Utah's Wrongful Lien statute, U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The case was tried to a jury. The evidence at trial included 
testimony and exhibits showing that the notice of forfeiture was 
two days premature. The jury was instructed that a seller may not 
forfeit a buyer's interest under a real estate contract unless the 
seller strictly complies with the notice provisions of the 
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contract. (R. 1012, Addendum [hereafter, "Add."] 43.) Despite 
this instruction, the jury found that Seller performed all steps 
necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest in the contract. (R. 1024, 
Add. 46.) 
The jury was also instructed as to the elements of a cause of 
action for a wrongful lien, U.C.A. § 38-9-1. (R. 1016-1017.) The 
jury found that Buyer's filing of a notice of interest violated the 
Wrongful Lien statute. (R. 1024, Add. 46.) 
Based upon the jury's findings, the trial court entered 
judgment for the Seller, ruling that the contract was null and 
void; that Buyer's interest in the property was forfeited; and 
assessing attorney's fees against Buyer based on a provision in the 
Wrongful Lien statute that permits an owner who proves wrongful 
lien to recover their attorney fees incurred in doing so. (R. 
1066-1067, Add. 50-51.) 
Buyer filed a timely motion for a new trial on the issues of 
(1) whether Seller performed all steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's 
interest under the contract and (2) whether Buyer's filing of a 
notice of interest violated the Wrongful Lien statute. (R. 1146-
1156, 1222-1231.) 
3. Disposition in Court Below 
The trial court denied Buyer's motion for a new trial (R. 
1288-1290), and this appeal followed. (R. 1302-1304.) 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
The property in question is undeveloped land owned by 
defendant Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust 
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("Seller"). (R. 888, Add. 29.) Don Siggard, a trustee of the 
Seller, had developed three residential subdivisions in other 
locations. (Trial Transcript [hereafter, "Tr."] 442:3-5, 455:13-
15.) As part of his development work, Mr. Siggard had obtained 
surveys, had created site plans, and had been in charge of 
2 
completing all other tasks necessary to develop the subdivisions. 
(Tr. 455:8-10, 458:1-4, 460-467, 467:16-21.) 
Mr. Siggard was a licensed contractor for about 40 years. 
(Tr. 435:21-23, 436:19-20.) He also had, at different times in his 
life, a real estate license (Tr. 437:4-7, 438:3-24) and understood 
the use of various real estate documents, including uniform real 
estate contracts. (Tr. 439-440.) 
Because of his background, Mr. Siggard understood the high 
costs and risk involved in developing raw ground. He knew that a 
developer can make money when the market is right or lose money 
when the market is not right. (Tr. 471:22-25, 472:1-13.) 
The property in question is located within a 38-acre parcel. 
In 1988, this parcel had a value of approximately $25,000 per acre 
The site plans, which required the assistance of an engineer 
or architect, showed the location of proposed streets, sewer lines, 
water lines, gas lines, culverts, underground cabling, alleys, and 
easements. (Tr. 458-459; 467:16-21.) 
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For example, he obtained necessary approvals for sewer and 
culinary water; resolved surface and subsurface water issues; 
obtained utility and land drainage easements; obtained title 
reports; obtained necessary financing; hired engineers and 
surveyors; functioned as the general contractor; hired 
subcontractors to put in sewer and water lines, curb, and gutter; 
paid fees to the city and the appropriate utilities; applied for 
building permits; worked with flood control people; and was 
familiar with the city ordinances relating to the foregoing. (Tr. 
460-467; 467:16-21.) 
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for residential use. (Tr. 378:24-25, 379:1-9; cf. Tr. 434:11-25, 
435:1-3.) Commercial Investment Corporation ("Buyer") wanted to 
purchase 20 acres within the 38-acre parcel. (R. 888, Add. 29.) 
Buyer planned to do all the work necessary to have the property 
rezoned for commercial development; to obtain necessary site plan 
approval; and eventually to build a shopping center on the 
property. (Tr. 24:17-25, 26:20-25, 27:1-2, 39:20-21, 46:21-24, 
47:7-9, 50:18-21, 115:8.) The commercial rezoning would 
substantially increase the property's value. (Tr. 28:12-20, 
313:17-20, 632:24-25.) Estimates of the increased value due to 
commercial zoning ranged from $98,000 to $180,000 per acre. (Tr. 
313:17-2 0, 632:24-25.) 
The purchase contract was signed by the parties on August 31, 
1988. (Trial Exhibit 7.) (A copy is included in the Addendum at 
pages 1-14.) The contract describes the property being purchased 
as "approximately 20 acres of real property (the 'Property') 
located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East" in Sandy, 
Utah, "which property is part of" the 38-acre parcel. (Contract, 
f 1, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1.) The contract gives Buyer "the 
exclusive right" to designate its 20 acres anywhere within the 38-
acre parcel. (Contract, f 1, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1; Tr. 50:1-4, 
503:3-25.) In Buyer's applications to Sandy City for commercial 
zoning, Buyer requested zoning at the corner of 11400 South and 
1000 East. (E.g., Trial Exhibit 9; Tr. 216:22-25, 217:1-2.) 
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Later, by mutual agreement of Buyer and Seller, the number of 
acres to be purchased was reduced from 20 to 16. (Trial Exhibit 
17; Tr. 147:10-16, 148:19-22.) 
Buyer spent substantial time and money in seeking a rezoning 
of the property. Mr. Robert Busch, president of Buyer, testified 
that Buyer's costs in doing so were approximately $200,000. (Tr. 
134:10-25, 135:1.) Eventually, Sandy City approved the rezoning. 
(Tr. 133:13-19.) 
The purchase contract has a very specific provision as to 
forfeiture. It allows Seller, in the event of Buyer's default, to 
keep Buyer's prior payments under the contract as liquidated 
damages and to be free from all obligations to convey the property 
to Buyer. (Contract, f 18.A, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 4-5.) To 
exercise this forfeiture provision, however, Seller must provide 
both a notice of default giving Buyer 30 days from its receipt of 
the notice to cure the default, followed by a notice of forfeiture. 
The contract states: 
Sellers shall give Buyer written notice specifically 
stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer shall 
have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure 
shall include payment of Sellers' costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees; and (3) Sellers' intent to elect this 
remedy if the Buyer does not cure the default(s) within 
thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to cure such 
default(s) within thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall 
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of 
his failure to cure the default (s) and of Sellers' 
election of this remedy. [Contract, f 18.A. (emphasis 
added).] 
The contract requires annual interest payments of $56,000 
beginning on March 3, 1989. (Contract, f 2.A, Trial Exhibit 7, 
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Add. 2.) The first payment, however, was contingent on Buyer 
receiving commercial zoning, i.e., if Buyer failed to receive 
commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989, the contract was void. 
(Contract, f 16.) The parties amended the contract to remove this 
contingency (Trial Exhibit 17; Tr. 150:5-10), at which time Buyer 
made the first payment. (Tr. 398-400.) 
On March 3, 1990, Buyer/s second payment of $56,000 was due. 
Buyer did not make this payment. (Tr. 409-410.) Mr. Busch 
testified that the reason Buyer did not make this payment was 
because of a disagreement between him and Mr. Siggard over a survey 
required by the contract and because of a demand by Mr. Siggard 
that Buyer buy more ground. (Tr. 167:20-21.) Thereafter, the 
following events transpired: 
March 5, 1990 - Don Siggard, for Seller, sent a notice of 
default dated March 5, 1990 by certified 
mail. The notice described Buyer's default 
in paying the second annual payment of 
$56,000 and then stated, "Buyer has thirty 
days from receipt of this notice to cure the 
default." (Tr. 162:1-8, 410-411; Trial 
Exhibit 20 (emphasis added).) (A copy of 
this notice is included in the Addendum at 
page 15.) 
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March 6, 1990 - Robert Busch, for Buyer, received the notice 
of default. (Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted 
Fact (o), R. 890, Add. 31.3) 
April 2, 1990 - Don Siggard sent a notice of forfeiture 
dated April 3, 1990 by certified mail. The 
notice stated in part, "Since, the default 
notified in the first letter mailed March 5, 
1990 was not cured, receipt of this letter 
releases seller of all obligations to the 
original contract with [Buyer] dated August 
31, 1988." (Tr. 412:6-7; Trial Exhibit 21.) 
(A copy of this notice is also included in 
the Addendum at page 17.) 
April 3, 1990 - Robert Busch received the notice of 
forfeiture. (Tr. 164:17-18; Trial Exhibit 
21, Add. 17-18.) 
In other words, the notice of default gave Buyer until April 
5. 1990 (30 days from Buyer's receipt on March 6, 1990) to cure. 
But Buyer received the notice of forfeiture on April 3, 1990, the 
28th day of the 3 0-day cure period. At trial, Mr. Siggard admitted 
3 
Although the trial transcript shows that Mr. Busch testified 
he received the notice of default on March 5th (Tr. 161:20), this 
was obviously an error on his part. The parties stipulated in the 
Pretrial Order that the notice of default was sent on March 5, 1990 
and received on March 6, 199 0. (Pretrial Order, Uncontroverted 
Fact (o); R. 890.) . It would make no sense for the notice to have 
been mailed and received on the same day. Furthermore, Mr. Siggard 
admitted at trial that the notice of forfeiture was "two days 
early." (Tr. 412:22-25.) The notice of forfeiture, which was 
received on April 3, 1990, could only have been two days early if 
the notice of default was received on March 6, 1990. 
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that the notice of forfeiture "was two days early." (Tr. 412:22-
25.) 
When Buyer received the notice of forfeiture, Buyer took it 
seriously. The next day, April 4, 1990, Buyer filed a notice of 
interest against the 38-acre parcel. (Trial Exhibit 22, Add. 19; 
Tr. 166:5-10, 251:8-10.) That same day, he instructed his attorney 
to send a letter to Seller. (Tr. 168:1-11, 251:5-7.) Mr. Siggard 
received this letter on approximately April 5, 1990. (Tr. 413:19-
25.) This letter stated, among other things, that Buyer considered 
Seller's notice of forfeiture to be deficient because it was sent 
two days premature. (Trial Exhibit 23, Add. 21-22; Tr. 413:12-25.) 
Despite this letter, Mr. Siggard did not notify Buyer that it had 
any additional time in which to pay the $56,000. (See Tr. 541:16-
22.) 
Two years later, Buyer commenced this lawsuit. Initially, 
Buyer sought damages. (R. 1, 6.) Later, Buyer amended the 
complaint to seek specific performance. (R. 295, 300-303, 304-
305.) Prior to trial, Buyer elected specific performance as its 
remedy. (R. 633-634.) 
Seller counterclaimed. Seller sought, among other things, 
damages for Buyer's breach of contract. Seller also claimed 
damages for wrongful lien. (R. 14, 18-20, 466, 473-479.) 
Prior to trial, the parties agreed upon a Pretrial Order, 
which was signed by the trial judge. (R. 882-900.) (A copy of 
this order is included in the Addendum at pages 23-42.) 
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At trial, Buyer had two theories. The first was that Seller 
had materially breached the contract by failing to provide a survey 
required by the contract; that because of Seller's failure to 
provide the survey, Buyer was excused from making the $56,000 
payment; that Buyer was ready, willing, and able at the time of 
trial to perform under the contract; and that, therefore, Buyer was 
entitled to specific performance of the contract. (Jury 
Instructions 16, 18, 25, 26; R. 991, 993, 1000, 1001; see Tr. 
722:9-18.) The jury found against Buyer on this theory. (See 
Special Verdict, Findings No. 3, 4, & 5; R. 1024.) Buyer does not 
contest the jury findings on this theory. 
Buyer's second theory was that "even if [Seller] did not 
materially default, their attempt to forfeit [Buyer] was invalid 
because they did not comply with the notice requirements of the 
Contract." (Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 12; R. 912.) This 
theory is found in the Pretrial Order both as a contested issue of 
fact ("[w]hether [Seller] complied with the forfeiture and notice 
provisions of the contract") and as a contested issue of law 
("[w]hether [Seller] was required to comply with the forfeiture and 
notice provisions of the contract"). (Pretrial Order, at 10, 11; 
R. 891, 892, Add. 32, 33.) 
Buyer presented evidence regarding Seller's failure to comply 
with the notice provisions of the contract. For example, Mr. Busch 
testified that he felt he had been "illegally forfeited" out of his 
interest in the property. (Tr. 166:15.) One reason was because 
"[n]otice was not right. [Mr. Siggard] gave me 30 days [in which 
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to cure the default], then forfeits me out in 28." (Tr. 166:23-
25.) Mr. Busch also testified that although he did not pay the 
$56,000 in the last two days of the 30-day cure period, he "could 
have." (Tr. 252:10.) 
As part of Seller7s presentation of its evidence, Mr. Siggard 
testified that he prepared the notice of default and knew that it 
gave Buyer 30 days from receipt to cure the default. (Tr. 410:6-
19, 539:14-25, 540:1-6.) He also testified, however, that when he 
prepared the notice of forfeiture he thought the 3 0-day period ran 
from the date the initial payment was due (i.e., March 3, 1990): 
Q What did you do when you didn't hear anything 
from [Buyer]? 
A Then, I thought from the time the payment was 
due on March 3rd that they had 30 days to respond, and so 
at the end of 30 days from then I sent another letter 
telling them the contract was over. 
. . . . 
Q Did you send the second notice out 28 - only 28 
days after the first notice had been received? 
A I would have to count the days. When I sent 
the second notice, I had forgot about the 30 days [being] 
from the note being received, and thought it was 30 days 
after the payment was due. 
Q Did you go back and review the first letter 
before you sent the second letter? 
A I did not. 
Q How did you know what date to count from? 
A I counted from March 3rd. 
Q Why did you count from March 3rd? 
A Because that's when the payment was due. [Tr. 
411:18-23, 540:15-21, 541:1-3 (emphasis added).] 
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Mr. Siggard also testified that "under my thinking, [Buyer] 
could have easily made the $56,000 [payment]" during the last two 
days of the 30-day cure period. (Tr. 541:19-22.) Mr. Siggard did 
not put on any evidence, however, that he communicated this to 
Buyer, i.e., that he notified Buyer it had two additional days in 
which to pay the $56,000. He also did not put on any evidence that 
he offered to work out an arrangement to put the contract back into 
effect or to help Buyer realize any return on Buyer's development 
efforts and expense. 
The jury made findings by way of a special verdict. The 
jury's findings, as recounted in the trial court's Judgment, were 
as follows: 
(i) The contract between [Buyer] and [Seller] was 
a valid contract. (This finding was stipulated to by the 
parties prior to submission to the jury); and 
(ii) [Buyer] failed to fully tender its 
performance and perform all of its contractual 
obligations according to the terms of the Contract 
including the timely payments of all amounts due (this 
finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to 
submission to the jury); and 
(iii) [Buyer] was not excused from tendering its 
performance and from performing its contractual 
obligations including its annual interest payment 
obligations; and 
(iv) [Buyer] is not allowed to assert that it was 
excused from failing to perform its obligations by any 
one of the following: a) estoppel, b) waiver and/or 
unclean hands[; and] 
(v) [Buyer] is not entitled to specific 
performance of the Real Estate Contract; and 
(vi) [Seller] performed all steps necessary to 
forfeit [Buyer's] interest in the contract; and 
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(vii) The Notice of Interest was filed by [Buyer] 
in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and 
(viii) [Buyer] breached the Real Estate Contract. 
[Judgment at 2-3 (emphasis added), R. 1065-1066, Add. 49-
50; see also Special Verdict at 1-2, R. 1023-1025, Add. 
45-47.] 
The jury also found that Buyer's actual damages proximately 
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest were $0. [Judgment 
at 3, R. 1066; see also Special Verdict at 3, R. 1025.] 
Based on the jury's findings, the trial court entered the 
following judgment: 
1. [Buyer's] First Amended Complaint for Specific 
Performance is dismissed with prejudice; 
2. [Seller's] Counterclaims for breach of contract 
and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby 
made null and void, and [Buyer's] interest in any and all 
real property under the Real Estate Contract is 
forfeited; and 
3. [Seller's] Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1 is hereby granted and, 
because no actual damages were offered at trial or found 
by the jury, the statutory penalty of $1,000 is hereby 
entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and 
attorneys' fees to be submitted. [Judgment at 3-4 
(emphasis added), R. 1066-1067, Add. 50-51.] 
Buyer filed a timely motion for a new trial of the jury 
findings that (1) Seller performed all steps necessary to forfeit 
Buyer's interest in the contract and (2) the Notice of Interest was 
filed by [Buyer] in violation of the Utah Wrongful Lien Statute. 
(R. 1146-1156, 1222-1231.) The basis for Buyer's motion was Utah 
R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), which permits a new trial because of 
"[i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against the law." (R. 1146-1156.) 
13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: A trial court's denial of a motion for new trial 
based on insufficiency of the evidence is reversed only if the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unjust and 
unreasonable. This case meets that standard. 
POINT II: Under Utah law, a seller must comply strictly with 
the notice provisions of the contract to forfeit a purchaser's 
interest. Seller failed to do this. Also, even though Buyer 
immediately notified Seller of the defective notice, Seller failed 
to give Buyer any additional time in which to make the $56,000 
payment. Therefore, the forfeiture was invalid, and the jury's 
finding on this issue should be reversed. 
POINT III: Under the Wrongful Lien statute, Buyer's notice of 
interest is not "wrongful" unless it was "groundless" or contained 
"a false claim." A groundless lien is one that has "no arguable 
basis" or is "not supported by any credible evidence." Here, 
Buyer's notice of interest against the 38-acre parcel was supported 
by the fact that the notice of forfeiture was two days premature; 
that Buyer had the right to designate its 16 acres anywhere within 
the 38-acre parcel; that Buyer was not contractually obligated to 
do so until after site plan approval; that Buyer could not do so 
until after site plan approval; and that a site plan application 
could not be submitted without a perimeter boundary survey, which 
Buyer did not receive until July 1994. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Where a party moves for a new trial based upon insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the trial court 
denies the motion, the trial court's denial will be reversed on 
appeal only if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." Nelson v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 
730, 732 (Utah 1982). Accord Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 
746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah App. 1987); Rovlance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 
232, 234 (Utah App. 1987). 
In this case, the foregoing standard is met. As will be 
shown, the only evidence was that Seller failed to comply with the 
contractual requirement that Buyer be allowed 30 days in which to 
cure its default. And, given that the notice of forfeiture was 
premature, Buyer had reasonable grounds to file its notice of 
interest, and thus did not violate the Wrongful Lien statute. 
II. THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SELLER PERFORMED ALL STEPS 
NECESSARY TO FORFEIT BUYERS INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT 
Buyer does not dispute the jury's findings that Buyer was not 
excused from making the $56,000 annual interest payment; that Buyer 
breached the contract; or that, consequently, Buyer is not entitled 
to specifically enforce the contract. (R. 1024, Add. 46.) The 
issue before this Court is, given the jury's finding of Buyer's 
breach of contract, what steps were necessary for Seller to forfeit 
Buyer's interest under the contract? 
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A. The Strict Compliance Rule 
Forfeiture is a harsh remedy. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that forfeitures "are not favored in the law" (Russell v. 
Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1973)) 
and are "regarded as odious to the law." Morgan v. Sorenson, 
3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229, 231 (1955). Consequently, "one who 
seeks to invoke a forfeiture must strictly comply with the 
prerequisites thereof." Russell v. Park City Corp., supra, 506 
P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added). 
Forfeiture is especially harsh when it is used by a seller to 
terminate a buyer's interest under a real estate contract. Unlike 
4 
other seller remedies, which protect a buyer's equity or give a 
5 
buyer a period of time in which to redeem the property, a 
forfeiture irrevocably terminates a buyer's entire equity interest 
in the property regardless of how valuable that interest may be. 
To soften the harshness of forfeiture and to afford buyers 
some degree of protection, the Utah courts have consistently 
applied the strict compliance rule to real estate sales. For 
example in Grow v. Marwick Development Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah 1980) , the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A trust deed foreclosure, for example, protects a buyer's 
equity because any money received at the public auction over the 
amount of the debt goes back to the defaulting buyer. 
The contract in this case permits the seller to treat the 
contract as a note and mortgage and institute foreclosure 
proceedings. (Contract, para. 18.B, Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 5.) 
Such a remedy gives the buyer six months in which to redeem the 
property. U.C.A. § 78-37-6; Utah R.Civ.P. 69(j)(3). 
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This Court has consistently held that in order to 
forfeit a purchaser's interest under a uniform real 
estate contract, the seller must comply strictly with the 
notice provisions of the contract. 
In Grow, the seller sent a notice of default twice, then a 
notice of forfeiture, followed by another notice of default to 
bring the contract current within 15 days or forfeiture would 
result. The supreme court held the foregoing series of notices to 
be "misleading," stating that "[t]his would leave some doubt in the 
[buyers'] minds as to what the [seller] expected." 621 P.2d at 
1252. Therefore, the court held that the buyer had until the final 
15-day period to bring the contract current. 
Another Utah case applying the strict compliance rule is Adair 
v. Bracken, 745 P.2d 849 (Utah App. 1987). There the contract 
provided that sellers had a right to forfeit the buyers in the 
event of default, "upon the failure of Buyer to remedy default 
within five days after written notice." 745 P.2d at 852. The 
sellers' agent sent buyers a notice of default which was defective 
because it failed to mention sellers' intentions to pursue their 
contractual remedies if buyers did not cure the default. Id. at 
850. Later the sellers' agent sent a second notice which was 
defective because it "fatally omitted" the amount the sellers were 
demanding. Id. at 852. In addition, the sellers failed to send a 
notice of forfeiture. Three years after the second notice was 
sent, the buyers tendered the full amount owing, which the sellers 
refused on the basis that the buyers' interest had been forfeited. 
Id. at 850. 
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After first quoting Grow v. Marwick, supra, this Court held 
the forfeiture invalid because the content of the two notices of 
default was defective, and because no notice of forfeiture was 
sent. This Court emphasized that the sending of a notice of 
forfeiture is not just a mere formality, but is an essential, 
substantive requirement. This Court stated: 
A notice of forfeiture is a declaration that the 
seller is no longer just threatening to invoke this 
contractual remedy, but has in fact elected the 
forfeiture option—after the buyers7 failure to cure the 
default within a reasonable time after adequate notice of 
default—and has thereby terminated the buyers7 
contractual interest. . . . A notice of forfeiture leaves 
no room for speculation about the extinguishment of the 
buyers7 rights in the contract. [745 P.2d at 853 (bold 
added).] 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court held that the sellers 
had failed to forfeit the buyers7 rights prior to the buyers7 
tender of full payment. 
The strict compliance rule is fair to a seller, because it 
imposes no great burden for a seller to comply with the notice 
requirements it has already agreed to in the contract. The strict 
compliance rule is preferable to a "substantial" compliance rule 
because it creates a definite, bright-line test. With a 
substantial compliance rule, that line would always be in question. 
Is a notice delivered two days early permissible? What about five 
days early? Ten days? Fifteen days? The wisdom of the strict 
compliance rule is that it avoids this quandary. 
A substantial compliance rule would create the very problems 
that Grow v. Marwick and Adair v. Bracken seek to prevent. If a 
seller could send notice of forfeiture early, then (paraphrasing 
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Grow) it would be "misleading" and would "leave doubt" in the 
buyer's mind as to what was expected. And (paraphrasing Adair) the 
buyer would be left to "speculate" as to whether his rights had 
been extinguished. 
The jury was instructed as to the strict compliance rule. 
Jury Instruction 38 states, "In order to forfeit a purchaser's 
interest under a real estate contract, the Seller must comply 
strictly with the notice provisions of the contract." (R. 1012.) 
B. Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict 
As has been stated in the Facts section, supra, the evidence 
showed that the contract required Seller to give Buyer 30 days to 
cure its default, and that Buyer received the notice of forfeiture 
two days before the 3 0-day cure period expired. Indeed, Mr. 
Siggard admitted that the notice of forfeiture was "two days 
early." (Tr. 412:22-25.) In response, Buyer immediately filed a 
notice of interest and instructed its attorney to send a letter 
pointing out that the forfeiture notice was premature. At that 
point, Seller could have corrected the error either by notifying 
Buyer that it had two extra days in which to make a payment, or by 
starting the whole process over again. Seller did neither of these 
things. (See Tr. 541:16-22.) 
The only evidence that might be construed as supporting the 
jury's finding is Mr. Siggard's testimony that he sent the 
forfeiture notice early by mistake. He thought the 30-day period 
ran from the date payment was due (March 3, 1990) rather than the 
date Buyer received the notice of default (March 6, 1990). Under 
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the strict compliance rule, however, this is not relevant. A buyer 
is entitled to proper notice. If notice is improper, it does not 
matter whether the error is intentional or accidental. If proper 
notice is not given, the attempted forfeiture is invalid. Grow v. 
Marwick, supra; Adair v. Bracken, supra. 
C. Conclusion 
Because the evidence on this point is not in dispute and 
because the law is clear, this Court should reverse the jury's 
finding, and remand this case with directions to the trial court to 
rule that Buyer's interest is not forfeited until Seller gives 
Buyer a new notice of default and a new opportunity to cure. In 
the alternative, a new trial of this issue should be ordered. If 
in the new trial the jury finds that Seller did not perform all 
steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest under the contract, 
then the trial court should rule that Buyer's interest is not 
forfeited until Seller gives Buyer a new notice of default and a 
new opportunity to cure. 
III. THE JURY ERRED IN FINDING THAT BUYER'S NOTICE OF INTEREST 
VIOLATED THE WRONGFUL LIEN STATUTE 
The jury found that Buyer's filing of a notice of interest 
violated the Wrongful Lien statute, U.C.A. § 38-9-1 et seq. Buyer 
also challenges this finding as being unsupported by the evidence. 
A. The Wrongful Lien Statute 
The Wrongful Lien statute provides landowners a cause of 
action against a person who claims an interest in real property, 
who records such a claim with the county recorder, and "who knows 
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or has reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, or 
contains a material misstatement or a false claim" U.C.A. 
§ 38-9-1. 
At trial, Seller did not contend that the notice of interest 
filed by Buyer was "forged" or that it contained "a material 
misstatement." Jury instruction 42, to which Seller took no 
exception (Tr. 710-717), states that seller must prove the notice 
of interest was "groundless" or "contained a false claim." (R. 
1016.) 
The term "groundless" is not defined in the statute, and 
apparently no Utah case has ever construed that term. However, in 
Evergreen West, Inc. v. Boyd, 810 P.2d 612 (Ariz. App. 1991), the 
Arizona Court of Appeals construed the term "groundless" in 
Arizona's Wrongful Lien statute, A.R.S. § 33-420, which has 
language very close to Utah's statute. In that case, the 
plaintiff sought to remove a lis pendens against its property. The 
court held that the statute permitted removal of a lis pendens 
alleged to be groundless 
6
 A.R.S. § 33-420(A) reads: 
A person purporting to claim an interest in, or a 
lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes a 
document asserting such claim to be recorded or filed in 
the office of the county recorder, knowing or having 
reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, 
or contains a material misstatement or false claim or is 
otherwise invalid is liable to the owner or beneficial 
title holder for the sum of not less than five thousand 
dollars, or for treble the actual damages caused by the 
recording or filing, whichever is greater, and reasonable 
attorney fees and costs of the action. [Emphasis added.] 
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only where the claim that the underlying action is one 
affecting title to real property has no arguable basis or 
is not supported by any credible evidence. [810 P.2d at 
619 (emphasis added).] 
In arriving at this definition, the Arizona court looked at 
Black7s Dictionary, which equates the term "groundless" with the 
term "frivolous." Id. at 619 (citing Black7s Dictionary at 704 
(6th ed. 1990) . "A claim . . . is frivolous if a proponent can 
present no rational argument" in support of that claim. 810 P.2d 
at 619 (citing Black's Dictionary, supra, at 668). 
In other words, to find that a person knows or has reason to 
know a claim is "groundless" requires more than simply finding that 
a claim lacks support. It must be so lacking in support that the 
person knows or has reason to know the claim has no arguable or 
rational basis, is frivolous, or is unsupported by any credible 
evidence. 
Consistent with the foregoing case law, the jury was 
instructed that a document is groundless "only if the interest 
claimed in the document has no arguable basis or is not supported 
by any credible evidence." (Jury Instruction No. 43; R. 1017.) 
B. Evidence Supporting the Jury's Verdict 
Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence supporting the jury's finding of Wrongful 
Lien is as follows: 
• When Buyer filed its notice of interest, Buyer 
had already received a notice of forfeiture 
from Seller. (Tr. 164-165.) 
• Buyer's notice of interest is against the 
entire 38-acre parcel, not just the 16 acres 
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Buyer was purchasing. (Trial Exhibit 22; Tr. 
166.) 
• In Buyer's applications to Sandy City for 
commercial zoning, Buyer requested zoning only 
at the corner of 11400 South and 1000 East. 
(E.g. Trial Exhibit 9; Tr. 216:22-25, 217:1-
2.) 
• Before Buyer defaulted, Mr. Siggard requested 
Buyer on more than one occasion to designate 
where its 16 acres would be, but Buyer did 
not. (Tr. 405:11-17, 407-408.) 
• In 1994, about four years after Buyer filed 
its notice of interest, Mr. Siggard paid for a 
perimeter survey of the entire 38-acre parcel. 
The purpose of the survey was to make it 
possible for Buyer to designate its 16 acres, 
so that Buyer could release its notice of 
interest as to the remaining 22 acres. But 
Buyer still did not designate the 16 acres. 
(Tr. 337:23-25, 338:10-25, 356:7-14, 422-423.) 
In regard to the location of the 16 acres, Mr. Siggard 
testified that the property that Buyers wanted was at the corner of 
11400 South and 1000 East: 
Q Okay. Let me just, then, ask if in this 
meeting in your home you had a discussion with Mr. Walton 
[Buyer's representative] related to identifying the 
approximate boundaries of commercial zoning? 
A Yes. He had pointed down to the corner of 
11400th South and 10th East, which would be the southeast 
corner of the intersection. 
Q Did he indicate a preference for the corner? 
A That was definitely the corner they wanted. 
[Tr. 383:17-25.] 
The foregoing evidence, however, is so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the jury's finding plainly unreasonable and unjust, in 
light of the following well-established facts: 
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1. The Notice of Forfeiture Was Premature. As shown at 
Point II, supra, the notice of forfeiture was received two days 
before the 3 0-day cure period had expired. Also, Buyer immediately 
sent a letter notifying Seller of the defect in the notice. Based 
upon the strict compliance rule previously discussed, Buyer had an 
"arguable basis" to believe that the forfeiture attempted by Seller 
was invalid and that, therefore, Buyer still had an interest in the 
property when it filed the notice of interest. 
2. Buyer Had the Right to Designate its Acreage Anywhere 
Within the 38-Acre Parcel. The contract gave Buyer "the exclusive 
right" to designate its acreage anywhere within the 38-acre parcel. 
(Contract, f 1; Trial Exhibit 7, Add. 1.) Mr. Siggard admitted 
this in cross-examination. 
7 . 
Q And it's your position or your feeling today, 
isn't it, that Commercial Investment Corporation still 
doesn't have the absolute right to choose where that 
ground will lie, isn't that correct: 
A No. They have the corner of it. According to 
the contract, they have the absolute right. 
Q Unless, at least as far as you're concerned, if 
that right is exercised in such a way as to pull this 
project away from the actual boundary that you think is 
there, you don't think they have that right, do you? 
A You mean from the boundary that they have put 
there? 
Q No, no. The actual boundary for your ground, 
wherever it may sit? 
A I guess legally they have that right. 
Q They do have that right? 
A They do have that right. 
Q Although you didn't want them to have that 
right. 
A Well, we verbally said it would be - with Andy 
Walton - it would be to my boundaries, but I guess the 
contract might call for something else. [Tr. 503:3-25 
(emphasis added).] 
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3. The Purchase Contract Did Not Require Designation of 
Buyer's Acreage Prior to Site Plan Approval. Pursuant to the 
purchase contract, two events had to occur before Buyer was 
required to designate its 16 acres: commercial zoning and site plan 
approval. Paragraph 3 of the contract provides that "[w]ithin 
forty-five (45) days after Buyer obtains from Sandy City the 
commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property, the 
parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this Contract 
into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note." (Contract, f 3, Trial 
Exhibit 7, Add. 2 (emphasis added); Tr. 115:15-19.) 
To obtain site plan approval, the developer was required to 
first submit one or more preliminary site plans. The final step 
was to then prepare a final site plan and submit it with a site 
plan application. (Tr. 127:4-5, 188:8-9, 189:17-18, 279:23-24, 
281:19-21, 339:11-16, 527:12-15; Trial Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 9, 35, 
37.) 
The commercial zoning was granted in August 1989. (Tr. 
133:13-19: 403:17-24.) Buyer submitted preliminary site plans, a 
final site plan, and an application for site plan approval. (Tr. 
127:4-5, 188:8-9, 189:17-18, 279:23-24, 281:19-21, 339:11-16; Trial 
Exhibits 3, 4, 8, 9, 35, 37.) But at no time prior to trial did 
Sandy City ever grant site plan approval. (Tr. 417:24-25, 418:1-
2.) Thus, at no time prior to trial was Buyer contractually bound 
to designate its 16 acres. 
4. Designation of Buyer's Acreage Was Not Possible Prior to 
Site Plan Approval. Prior to site plan approval, Buyer could not 
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designate its 16 acres. This is because the legal description 
attached to the commercial zone was only approximate. (Tr. 590:15-
18.) Mr. Michael Coulam, the community development director for 
Sandy City, testified that this zone was "not common" because it 
was designed to allow the site plan to shift a bit at the site plan 
approval stage. (Tr. 591:4-6, 11.) He further testified: 
Q In order to give the developer the ability to 
purchase ground from a seller, they would have to keep 
that legal description fluid, essentially, until site 
plan approval? 
A That's correct [Tr. 591:7-11.] 
Mr. Robert Busch, Buyer's president, similarly testified that 
when he met with Sandy City, the city "wanted us to shift the 
commercial site around somewhat." (Tr. 106:23-25.) He would not 
know until final site plan approval where the exact location of the 
property would be. (Tr. 50:18-23, 242:2-12, 243:3-4.) 
Consequently, when he filed the notice of interest, he used the 
legal description for the entire 38 acres: 
Q And why did you use the entire legal 
description for the 38 acres, as opposed to using one of 
the lesser legal descriptions — the 20, 16, 13 acres? 
A Because we had the right to select the 20 out 
of the 38. 
Q So why, if you had that right, did you need to 
use the legal description in its entirety? 
A Because I didn't know how to describe the acres 
at that time, starting on the 20, but I still did not 
know how to describe it because it had never been defined 
exactly insofar as the piece of ground that we were going 
to take. 
Q Hadn't been described because you had not yet 
obtained site plan approval? 
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A Site plan approval so I didn't know where it 
was going to be. [Tr. 263:2-18.] 
Although Mr. Siggard testified that, in his prior experience, 
any boundary changes required by the city occur on the preliminary 
site plans and not "right at the end" (Tr. 527:10-11), he was 
testifying only in the context of residential projects. (Tr. 
528:5-8.) The testimony of Michael Coulam and Mr. Busch were in 
the context of commercial projects. (Tr. 106:23-25, 590:13.) 
5. Site Plan Approval Could Not Be Obtained Without a 
Perimeter Boundary Survey. The contract requires Seller to provide 
Buyer "with a certified ALTA survey." (Contract, f 12, Trial 
Exhibit 7, Add. 3-4.) An ALTA survey is more detailed than an 
ordinary survey, because the surveyor locates all features that are 
actually on the property, such as easements of record, and anything 
else that might be germane to the use of the property. (Tr. 610:3-
11.) 
Sandy City's Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards set 
forth information that must be included in the final site plan 
filed with the site plan application. (Trial Exhibit 36; Tr. 348.) 
Such information includes dimension orientation; legal description; 
location and height of overhead power, communication, and 
transmission lines and utility easements; and location of all 
existing and proposed curbs, gutters, sidewalks, sewage mainlines, 
water lines, fire hydrants, and adjacent streets. (Tr. 350-351.) 
Prior to receiving the ALTA perimeter boundary survey, Buyer did 
not have any of this information. (Tr. 350-351.) The ALTA survey 
also provided other information required on the site plan 
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application, such as the location of beginning and ending points of 
the boundary and existing roads. (Tr. 342.) 
Hence, Mr. Busch testified that the "[b]oundary survey was 
necessary for me to then move forward and get a site plan 
approval." (Tr. 255:3-4.) As soon as he received the boundary 
survey in July 1994 (four years after filing suit), he proceeded to 
work on site planning approval and caused an application to be made 
to Sandy City on September 20, 1994. (Tr. 258:13-25; Trial Exhibit 
35.) 
Although it is true that Buyer wanted its 16 acres to be 
located at the corner of 114 00 South and 1000 East, Buyer could not 
ensure the exact location of its 16 acres until it had obtained 
final site plan approval. The boundary survey was a pre-requisite 
to this. (Tr. 255:3-4.) 
In light of the foregoing, it cannot be said that Buyer7s 
filing of a notice of interest against the entire 38-acre parcel 
was groundless, i.e., had no arguable basis or was not supported by 
any credible evidence. Buyer had an arguable basis for filing the 
notice, which was that it received the forfeiture notice two days 
premature and therefore believed, based on Utah law, that the 
forfeiture was invalid. Buyer also had an arguable basis for 
filing against the entire 38-acre parcel, based on the facts that 
Buyer had the right to designate its 16 acres anywhere within the 
38 acre parcel; that Buyer was not contractually obligated to 
designate until after it received site plan approval; that Buyer 
could not designate until it received site plan approval; and that 
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Buyer could not obtain site plan approval without the survey, which 
it did not receive until July 1994. For the same reasons, Buyer's 
filing of the notice of interest was not a "false claim." The 
jury's finding in this regard is unsupported. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury's findings should be reversed, and the case remanded 
with directions to the trial court to rule that Buyer's interest is 
not forfeited until Seller gives Buyer a new notice of default and 
a new opportunity to cure. In the alternative, the case should be 
remanded for a new trial on the contested issues with instructions 
to the trial court that if the jury finds that Seller did not take 
all steps necessary to forfeit Buyer's interest, then Buyer's 
interest is not forfeited until Seller gives Buyer new notice and 
a new opportunity to cure. 
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REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 'JCf 
This Contract is made and entered: into this 31 ' day of 
M^y, 1988 by and between Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, 
Trustees ("Sellers"), whose address is 3318 Oakcliff Drive, 
Holladay, Utah 84124 and Commercial Investment Corporation, a 
Utah corporation ("Buyer"), whose address is 5250 South 300 West, 
Suite 100, Murray, Utah 84107, 
RECITALS: 
A. On March 3, 1988, Sellers and Busch Corporation and/or 
assigns entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for the 
purchase of approximately 20 acres real property to be zoned 
commercial. Busch Corporation has assigned all of its right, 
title and interest in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement to Buyer. 
B. Pursuant to the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, Buyer has no obligation to close until: (1) Sandy City 
has approved Buyer's site plan and commercial zoning; (2) Buyer 
has verified proper access to existing utilities and public 
roadways: and (3) Buyer has approved the survey. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual 
promises contained herein and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Property. Sellers agree to sell and Buyer agrees to 
buy approximately 20 acres of real property (the "Property") 
located at the southeast corner of 11400 South 1000 East, in the 
City of Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, which Property 
is part of: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 20, Township 3 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
excepting therefrom the following: Beginning 
North 0°07f30H West 1327.82 feet from the 
South quarter corner of said Section 20; and 
running thence North 0°07f30" West 180.84 
feet; thence North 89°52'30" East 456 feet; 
thence South 0°07,30" East 183.58 feet more 
or less; thence North 89*46'51" West 456 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 
Buyer shall have the exclusive right to identify the boundaries 
of the Property it is purchasing which boundaries shall not 
exceed the boundaries delineated on Exhibit "A.,f Buyer agrees 
that it will not purchase property and identify boundaries 
thereto which encompass all of the frontage to the property along 
11400 South; Sellers shall retain sufficient frontage on 11400 
South to have direct access to its proposed residential 
development as set forth on the Crescent Village Community 
00002 
Shopping Center Site Plan, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, 
2. Price and Payment. 
A. Buyer agrees to pay Sellers for the Property the 
purchase price of Thirty Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00) per 
acre payable at Sellers1 address above given, or Sellers1 order, 
on the following terms: 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) ("Down 
Payment"), receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged; and Buyer shall pay annual 
interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 and 
continuing on the 3rd day of each March 
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time 
the entire unpaid principal balance together 
with accrued interest shall be paid in full. 
Interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. 
Interest to accrue from March 3, 1988. 
B. The parties agree to deposit the Down Payment with 
Landmark Title Company and hereby instruct Landmark Title Company 
to deposit the Down Payment in its interest bearing Trust 
Account. The Down Payment, with the accrued interest, shall be 
disbursed to Sellers upon the execution of a Trust Deed and Note 
and Warranty Deed as required by Paragraph 3 below. In the event 
Buyer duly rescinds this Contract, then the principal of the Down 
Payment shall be returned to Buyer and the interest accrued 
thereon shall be paid to Sellers. 
C. The Installment Note in the amount of $5,000.00, 
which was attached to the Earnest Money Sales Agreement as part 
of the Down Payment, is hereby cancelled. 
3. Merger of Contract Into Deed and Trust Deed and Note. 
Within forty-five (45) days after Buyer obtains from Sandy City 
the commercial zoning and site plan approval for the Property, 
the parties agree to terminate this Contract and merge this 
Contract into a Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. Buyer shall 
execute and deliver to Sellers a Trust Deed and Note and Sellers 
shall execute and deliver to Buyer a Warranty Deed. Buyer shall 
give Sellers written notice so that parties can select a mutually 
convenient date for the termination of this Contract and 
execution of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed, and Note. Copies of 
the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note are attached hereto as 
Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively and by this reference made 
a part hereof. 
4. Partial Releases, Sellers agree to partially release 
their security interest in the Property and convey a Warranty 
Deed to Buyer for such released property upon payment under this 
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Contract of $35,000.00 towards principal per acre. Sellers agree 
to execute such releases and warranty deeds at the request of 
Buyer. Buyer may make such request at any such time as any 
principal payments are made. 
5. Date of Possession. Sellers agree to deliver to Buyer 
possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of each acre 
of the Property upon merger of this Contract into Deed, Trust 
Deed, and Note as set forth in Paragraph 3 above. 
6. Risk of Loss. All risk of loss and destruction of the 
Property shall be borne by Sellers until Buyers take possession 
of the Property. 
7. Conveyance of Title. Sellers, on receiving the 
payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
specified herein, agree to execute and deliver to Buyer, or its 
assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title 
to the Property free and clear of all encumbrances except those 
which have accrued by or through the acts or neglect of Buyer and 
subject to the exceptions to title that are contained in the 
Commitment described in Section 8. 
8. Evidence of Title. Sellers shall provide Buyer with a 
Preliminary Commitment for Title Insurance ("Commitment") on the 
Property at the time of or prior to execution of this Contract. 
Sellers shall, at their expense and upon execution of the 
documents described in paragraph 3 above, furnish Buyer evidence 
of marketable title in the form of an Owner's Title Insurance 
Policy ("Title Policy") insuring Buyer's interest in the Property 
under this Contract for the amount of the purchase price. The 
Title Policy issued to Buyer will contain the following numbered 
exceptions shown on the Cqmmitment: ^r^Hecfa ler )&' vj^cr/cW^, 
, ^ £ y ^XTGr^i /7&ret t **>d /drift* KS 
. 
9. Underlying Obligations. Except for 1988 taxes and 
assessments, Sellers warrant that there are no underlying 
obligations against the Property, 
10. Sellers' Covenant Against Liens. Except for the liens 
and encumbrances listed in Sections 8 and 9, Sellers covenant to 
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances 
resulting from acts of Sellers. 
11. Buyer's Covenant Against Liens. Buyer covenants to 
keep the Property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances 
resulting from acts of Buyer during the term of this Contract, 
except for property which Buyer purchases under Section 4 herein. 
12. Survey. Sellers agree, at their expense, to provide 
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Buyer with a certified ALTA survey within forty-five (45) days 
after Buyer obtains from Sandy City the commercial zoning for the 
Property. 
13. Zoning. Sellers warrant and represent that they have 
received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation 
concerning the Property which has not been remedied prior to the 
execution of this Contract. 
14. Taxes and Assessments. Sellers agree to pay all taxes 
and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property 
during the life of this Contract. Sellers covenant that there 
are no taxes, assessments, or liens against the Property not 
mentioned in Section 8. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and 
assessments upon and after execution of the documents described 
in paragraph 3 above. Buyer further agrees to reimburse Sellers 
for all taxes and assessment they pay from the Contract date to 
the execution of the documents described in paragraph 3 above. 
15. No Waste. Buyer agrees not to commit nor suffer to be 
committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the Property 
which would impair Sellers' security. 
16. Commercial Zoning. Buyer, at its expense, shall apply 
for commercial zoning on the Property to build a commercial 
center thereon. However, should Buyer fail, with or without 
cause, to obtain such commercial zoning prior to March 3, 1989, 
then the Contract shall be void and the Down Payment refunded to 
Buyer. 
17. Sellers' Option to Discharge Obligations. If Buyer 
defaults in the payment of taxes, assessments or other expenses 
of the Property, Sellers may, at Sellers' option, pay said taxes, 
assessments, insurance premiums or other expenses. If Sellers 
elect to do so, Buyer agrees to repay Sellers upon demand all 
such sums so advanced and paid by Sellers together with interest 
thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum until paid. When the principal sum 
provided in this Contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay 
Sellers such advances, Sellers may refuse to convey title to the 
Property until such repayment is made. 
18. Buyer's Default. Should Buyer fail to comply with any 
of the terms hereof, Sellers may, in addition to any other 
remedies afforded the Sellers in this Contract or by law, elect 
either of the following remedies: 
A. Sellers shall give Buyer written notice 
specifically stating: (1) the Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer 
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure shall 
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include payment of Sellers1 costs and reasonable attorney's fees; 
and (3) Sellers' intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does 
not cure the default(s) within thirty (30) days. Should Buyer 
fail to cure such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then 
Sellers shall give to Buyer another written notice informing 
Buyer of his failure to cure the default(s) and of Sellers' 
election of this remedy. Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of 
this second written notice, Sellers shall be released from all 
obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer, 
and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Sellers. All 
payments which have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this 
Contract shall, subject to then existing law and equity, be 
retained by Sellers as liquidated and agreed damages for breach 
of this Contract; or 
B. Sellers shall give Buyer written notice 
specifically stating: (1) The Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer 
shall have thirty (30) days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Sellers' 
intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure the 
default(s) with the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to cure 
such default(s) within the thirty (30) days, then Sellers shall 
give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of its 
failure to cure the default(s), Sellers' election of this remedy, 
and that the entire unpaid balance hereunder is at once due and 
payable. Thereupon, Sellers may treat this Contract as a note 
and mortgage, pass or tender title to Buyer subject thereto, and 
proceed immediately with a mortgage foreclosure in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. Upon filing the foreclosure 
complaint in court, Sellers shall be entitled to the immediate 
appointment of a receiver. The receiver may take possession of 
the Property, collect rents, issues and profits therefrom and 
apply them to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold 
them pursuant to the order of the court. Upon entry of a 
judgment of foreclosure, Sellers shall not be entitled to 
possession of the Property until the redemption period expires. 
19. Buyer's Remedies. In addition to any other remedy 
available to Buyer at law or in equity, Buyer may elect to 
rescind this Contract upon the occurrence of any of the 
following: 
A. Buyer's reasonable objection to the survey; 
B. Buyer's inability to obtain direct and immediate 
access, without unreasonable expense, to existing utilities for 
sewer, water, natural gas and electricity; 
C. Buyer's failure to obtain access to the Property 
from paved public roadways; 
D. Buyer's failure, with or without cause, to obtain 
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commercial zoning, acceptable to Buyer, for a commercial -center 
on the Property; and 
E. Sellers breach of any covenant or term contained 
in this Contract• 
Upon rescission of the Contract, the Down Payment shall be 
returned to Buyer and Buyer shall have no further obligations 
under this Contract• 
20. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is 
of the essence in this Contract. 
21. Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit 
modify, or alter the provisions in the Section. 
22. Notices. Except as otherwise provided herein, all 
notices required under this Contract will be effective when: (a) 
personally delivered; or (b) mailed certified or registered, 
addressed to the applicable party at the address shown in this 
contract, or at such other address as may be hereinafter 
designated by such party by written notice to the other party. 
23. Binding Effect. This Contract is binding on the heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and assigns of the 
respective parties hereto. 
24. Entire Agreement. This Contract contains the entire 
agreement between the parties hereto. Any provision hereof not 
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not affect 
the validity of any other provisions hereof. No supplement, 
modification or amendment of this Contract shall be binding on 
the parties hereto unless signed in writing by both parties 
hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this 
Contract the day and year first above written. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 3 1 * day of /7JJAAAATT 
personally appeared before me Don Niggard and Glenna F. Siggard, 
Trustees, signers of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
19 86 




ublic ding at y/C, /AfaA 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:ss. 
On t h e ^ / f l d a* °f /ft/atM* 
appeared before me {foafad/Jj 7> 
duly sworn, d id say t h a t he Jte 
, 19ft3fl, p e r s o n a l l y 
A/a//ms< >„ who being by me 
the i/fci /yiesufAn-F of 
Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporat ion and that 
instrument was s igned i n behalf of s a i d corporat ion by author i ty 
of i t s bylaws (or of a r e s o l u t i o n of i t s Board of D i r e c t o r s as 
the case may b e ) , and s a i d /9s?dnJkJd ^jJ^/L/rry^ acknowledge t o me 
that s a i d corporat ion executes the^/feame. 
No£^£^£ubl i c 
Residing at 
< &££ 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Busch Corporation 
5250 South 300 West, Suite 100 
Murray, Utah 84107 
WARRANTY DEED 
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, grantors, Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby CONVEY and 
WARRANT to Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation 
of Murray, Utah, grantee, for the sum of Ten DOLLARS and other 
good and valuable consideration the following described tract of 
land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
See legal description attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A," 
DATED this day of , 19 • 
Don Siggard, Trustee* 
Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before me Don Siggard, Trustee and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustee who 
being by me duly sworn, did duly acknowledge to me that they 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at _ 
My commission expires: 




When Recorded Mail To: 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees 
3318 Oakcliff Drive 
Holladay, Utah 84124 
TRUST DEED 
THIS TRUST DEED, made effective this 3rd day of March, 1988, 
between Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah corporation, as 
TRUSTOR, whose address is 5250 South 300 West, Suite 100, Murray, 
Utah 84107, Landmark Title Company,TRUSTEE, and Don Siggard and 
Glenna F, Siggard, Trustees, BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN 
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, 
situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah: 
See legal description attached hereto 
and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A." 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon 
and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, issues, 
profits, income, tenements, hereditament, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging now or hereafter used or 
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to 
and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, 
issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING. (1) payment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by a trust deed note of even date herewith 
and all sums due thereunder, in the face amount of $ , 
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times 
and in the manner therein set forth, and any extensions and/or 
renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each 
agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such 
additional loans or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, 
or its successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note 
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and 
(4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary 
under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED: 
1. Trustor agrees to comply with all laws, covenants and 
restrictions affecting said property; not to commit or permit 
waste thereof; not commit, suffer or permit any act upon said 
property in violation of law; to do all other acts which from the 
character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary, 
the specific enumerations herein not excluding the general. 
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2. Trustor agrees to appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; 
provided, however, that such action or proceeding shall arise 
from a person or entity claiming by, through, or under Trustor. 
3. Trustor agrees to pay before delinquent all taxes and 
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments 
upon water company stock and all rents, assessments, charges, and 
liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which 
at any time appear to be prior or superior thereto. Trustor further agree 
not to encumber the property, subject to this T. D. with any addit' 1 mort-
4. Trustor agrees should Trustor fail to make any payment v9ag$ 
or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee,* 
but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand 
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any obligation 
hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to sucty 
extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security-
hereof; Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon 
said property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend 
any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof 
or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, 
contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in 
the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto. 
This paragraph 4, however, does not apply if the claim of a third 
party would constitute a breach of the covenants in the Warranty 
deed from Beneficiary to Trustor. 
5. Trustor agrees to pay immediately and without demand all 
sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with simple 
interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent 
(10%) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be 
secured hereby. 
6. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or 
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other 
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, 
awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be 
entitled as their option to commence, appear in and prosecute in 
their own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. 
All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and 
proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and 
other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned by 
Beneficiary, who shall apply the same on the indebtedness secured 
hereby or to restore or repair the property damaged or otherwise 
as directed by Trustor. 
7. At any time and from time to time upon written request 
of Beneficiary, and after payment of the Trustee's fees and 
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presentation of this Trust Deed and the Note, without affecting 
the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness 
secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map 
or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any easement or 
creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination 
or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or 
charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part 
of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be 
described as "the person or persons entitled thereto," and the 
recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive 
proof of the truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay 
reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in 
this paragraph. 
8. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to 
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, 
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this 
Trust Deed. Unless Trustor executes a separate assignment to 
Beneficiary requiring that rents and profits be paid to 
Beneficiary, or until Trustor shall default in the payment of any 
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any 
agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all 
such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to the 
default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default 
as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall 
cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereto, to collect all 
rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or discontinuance 
of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any 
such monies shall not in any manner affect the subsequent 
enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to 
collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of 
the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed, 
to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or 
option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a subordination 
of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, 
lease or option. 
9. After Beneficiary has given Trustor written notice of 
any default by Trustor hereunder and Trustor fails to*cure such 
default within thirty (30) days after receipt of such notice, 
Beneficiary may, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to 
be appointed by the court (Trustor hereby consenting to the 
appointment of a person designated by Beneficiary as such 
receiver), enter upon and take possession of said property or any 
part thereof, in their own name sue for or otherwise collect said 
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, 
and apply the same upon any indebtedness secured hereby and in 
such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
10 • The entering upon and taking possession of said 
property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits or 
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the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or 
compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, 
and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not 
cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or 
invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
11. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly 
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such 
right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not 
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 
12. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any 
indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any 
agreement hereunder, Beneficiary shall give Trustor written 
notice specifically stating: (1) Trustors1 default(s) (2) That 
Trustor shall have 30 days from its receipt of such written 
notice within which to cure the default(s); and (3) Beneficiary's 
intent to elect either to foreclosure judicially or non-
judicially if Trustor does not cure the default(s) within the 
thirty (30) days. Should Trustor fail to cure such default(s) 
within the thirty (30) days, then Beneficiary shall give to 
Trustor another written notice informing Trustor of its failure 
to cure the default(s) and, Beneficiary's election of their 
remedy to foreclose either judicially or non-judicially, and that 
the entire unpaid balance under the Note is at once due and 
payable. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may elect to 
foreclose this Trust Deed under Title 57, Chapter 1 of Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended). Beneficiary may also elect to foreclose 
this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the foreclosure 
of mortgages on real property. 
13. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time 
by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each 
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a 
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed 
for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, 
duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any 
successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof 
made, in the manner provided by law. 
14. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit 
of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. All 
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term 
"Beneficiary11 shall mean the owner and holder, including any 
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust deed, when-
ever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the 




15. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly 
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by 
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of 
pending sale under any other Trust deed or of any action or 
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a 
party, unless brought by Trustee. 
16. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
17. Trustor hereby requests that a copy of any notice of 
default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to it at 
the address hereinbefore set forth. 
TRUSTOR: 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
By 
Its: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before me, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
of Commercial Investment Corporation, a Utah 
corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of 
said corporation in authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution 
of its board of directors, as the case may be), and said 
, acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at _ 




TRUST DEED NOTE 
$ Salt Lake City, Utah 
Effective March 3, 1988 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises to pay to the 
order of Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees, at 3318 
Oakcliff Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124, or at such other 
place as the holder hereof may designate, 
Dollars ($ ), together with 
interest from date at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as 
follows: 
Annual interest payments beginning March 3, 1989 
and continuing on the 3rd day of each succeeding March 
thereafter until March 3, 1998 at which time the entire 
unpaid principal shall be fully paid. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and 
the balance to the reduction of principal. Holders agree to 
cause the Trustee under the Trust Deed to partially reconvey 
their Trust Deed on the Property upon principal payment under 
this Note of $35,000.00 per acre. Maker may make such request 
and designate which acreage is to be reconveyed at any such time 
as Maker makes any principal payments hereunder. 
This Ntote is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, 




March 5 , 1990 
Commercial Investment Corp, 
5295 So. 300 West 
Murray, Ut. 84107 
To whom it may concern, 
To comply with section Eighteen-A with the contract between 
Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard to commercial investment 
Corporation dated August 31, 1989, we submit this notice of 
buyers default in annual option payment of Fifty Six Thousand 
^Dollars ($56,000.00) as of March 3, 1990. Buyer has thirty 
days from receipt of this notice to cure the default. 
Don Siggard 
3165 Fur Hollow Dr, 
Sandy, Utah 84093 
Please note address change 
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Return Receipt snowing to whom 





5295 So. 3rd West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Corp • 
April 3, 1990 
Commercial Investment Corp, 
enna 
31, 
In compliance to section 18-A of the contract with Don & c 
Siggard and the Commercial Investment Corp. dated Augur 
1988, we submit this second letter of buyers default in 
compliance to the agreement in the contract. Since, the default 
notified in the first letter mailed March 5, 1990 was not cured, 
rt * ipt of this letter releases seller of all obligations to 
the original contract with Commercial Investment Corp* dated 
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RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO INSUMNCi C0VUA8E HKMOED 
NOT m*. WTOWATK*AL HAIL 
~-om 3LSCH ZZFP 501 2S3 3S*3. 
WHEN RECORDEP PLEASE MAIL TOi 
imerc ia l Inves tment Corp. 
/O Busch C o r p o r a t i o n 
o b e r t Busch 
295 South 320 West #510 
LC, Utah 84107 
-u3 ^ 
NOTICE OF INTCRES 
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^ 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
The undersigned hereby give notice of an interest claimed with 
respect to certain real property located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, particularly described as follows, to-wit: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 3 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING TIICRErROM the followmgi BEGINNING North 0° 07 • 30" West 
1327.82 feet from the South quarter corner of Section 20; and running 
thence North 0°07'30" West 180.84 feet; thence North 89°52'30M East 
456 feet; thene South 0° 07'30" East 183.58 feet more or less; thence 
North 89°46,51M West 456 feet more or less to the point of 3CGINNING. 
Krcjuust of LANDMARK TITLE COMPANY 
KATIE L DIXON, nor order 
Silt Lako County, Utah 
« - 2 £ Entry No.ii^JO^ 
COURTESY RECORDING 
This document Is being recorded solely • • * 
courtesy and an accomodation to th9 oartlM 
named therein. LANOMARK TITLE COMPANY 
SJ!S lccu,lcy or tht *™«* 
DATEDi April 4, 1990 
'Ayfi^r' 
Robert R. Busch. President 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the 4th day of AprU 19 90 
appeared before me 
p^H*r» a wti«f»hJ priti<<in» ftf r^mm^rr^jil TnvflBfmunt Cnrnnrntinn 
the signer(s) of the foregoing instrument,who duly acknowledged 
to mil that ho executed the same. 
Icftary Publ ic No 
Residing att SLC, Utah 
My Commission Expiresi 07/90 
«HEN RECORDED PLEASE MAIL TOt 
"v»*rciaJ Investment Corp. 
C/o Husch Corporation 
ftobart Butch 
W95 South 320 Watt 1510 
• l.C, Utah 84107 
NOTICE Of INTEREST 00020 
KNOW ALL HEN BY THESE PRESENTS! 
The undersigned hartby give notlca of Mt\ interest claimed with 
n respect to certain raai property located in Salt Lake County, 
Irt State of Utah, particularly described at follows, to-witi 
•H 
S? The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 20, Township 3, 
^ South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROH th« foliowingi BEGINNING North 0° 07'30' Watt 
1327.82 feat from tha South quartar corner of Saction 20; and running 
thenca North 0°07'30" Heat 180.64 f^•t# thence North 89°52,30B 2aat 
4S6 feati thane South 0° 07'30* East 13.36 feat mora or less; thence 
North 89°4e,M' West 456 feat mora or last to tha point of BEGINNING. 
crvtmriYnsco^otNQ 
Th!tdc:vm'Ml . . i edooietyata 
oouflev * . .»i ... • •«> ,i>c rv-tjea 
ntrwr ih4 „#, lAf'O-^rj.. I*MU:C:C •: ,v/v 
htfufcy o #t%%'.j o-e- Xr. i v.y roipor.tlcll'ty 
or flawUry for tna accuracy or tha como.it 
thereof. 
DATEDi A p r i l 4. l t » 0 ftT^OypRATION 
Robert W. Butch , Praa ldant 
8TATI OF U1AH ) 
) it. 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
011
 **• 4 th day of 
appeared before a» _m 
Aarll 19 fo . personally 
• lofttft > .RusrJi, . fraattlanf ,nr Cnmmarrla} InvasfinaLf fnrnnrar Inn . 
^w'lljoer(e) of the foregoing instrvment,who duly acknowledged 
/ J*..hCy**t he executed the same. . 
ILC, Utah 
ion Ixpiren 07/90 
mi t ocnm 
*se#/ctio 
LAWRENCE E. OORBRIDGE 
JOHN KNAPP BAIRD 
JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN 
RICHARD C TERRY 
PAUL IX NEWTON 
MARK J MORRISE 
MICHAEL LEE 
TAMAR & JERGENSEN 
CORBRIDGE. B A I R D & C H R I S T E N S E N 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
215 SOUTH STATE 
SUTTE 800 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
A p r i l 4 , 1990 
0 0 0121 
TELEPHONE 
(80 It 534-0909 
TELECOPIER 
(801) 534-1048 
Via Mail, Certified Mail, Hand-Deliverv 
Mr. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, Trustees 
3165 Fur Hollow Drive 
Sandy, UT 84093 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Siggard: 
I have been retained by Commercial Investment Corporation to 
respond to your letters dated March 5, 1990, and April 3, 1990. 
In reviewing your notices and Commercial Investment Corporation's 
file I note the following deficiencies: 
1. The Amendment executed by Commercial Investment 
Corporation on March 30, 1989, has not been executed by Glenna F. 
Siggard, trustee; 
2. Don Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees under the 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust Agreement have not sent 
any notices required under paragraph 18 of the Real Estate 
Contract; 
3. The April 3, 1990, notice was sent two days premature. 
For the above stated reasons, both the March 5, 1990 letter 
and the April 3, 1990 letter are deficient. You are hereby put 
on notice that Commercial Investment Corporation will not 
recognize any notices in connection with the Real Estate Contract 
executed on August 31, 1988, unless they are executed by both Don 
Siggard and Glenna F. Siggard, trustees. Moreover, Commercial 
Investment Corporation hereby requests the return of the 
Amendment dated March 30, 1989, with the original signatures of 
both Don Siggard, trustee, and Glenna F. Siggard, trustee. 
As you know, Commercial Investment Corporation has obtained 
commercial zoning and site plan approval from Sandy City. 
Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Real Estate Contract, you were 
required to obtain and provide Commercial Investment Corporation 
with a certified ALTA survey which you have failed to do. You 
are hereby put on notice of your breach under paragraph 12 of the 
Real Estate Contract and requested to deliver the ALTA survey 
immediately. 
00022 
Don and Glenna Siggard 
April 5, 1990 
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This letter shall serve as the written notice required under 
paragraph 3 of the Real Estate Contract that Commercial 
Investment Corporation will be ready to select a mutually 
convenient date for the execution and delivery of the Warranty 
Deed, Trust Deed and Note after receiving the survey. 
Commercial Investment Corporation also requests evidence of 
full payment of all taxes and assessments against the property as 
required under paragraph 14 of the Real Estate Contract prior to 
the exchange of the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed and Note. 
Thank you for your attention in this matter. I expect 
prompt response with regard to delivery of the executed Amendment 
ALTA survey, and proof of payment of taxes. 
Sincerely, 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Christensen 




Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
James L. Christensen, (USB #0639) 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-0909 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 





DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Case No. 920904431CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
121647.3 
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This matter came before the Court on July 17, 1995, at a Pre-Trial Conference 
held pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure before the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki, Third District Court Judge. Randall N. Skanchy and Scott D. Cheney of 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendants, Don and 
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, Don and Glenna F. Siggard Trustees (the "Siggards"). 
James L. Christensen of Corbridge, Baird and Christensen, appeared as counsel for Plaintiff, 
Commercial Investment Corporation ("CIC"). The following action was taken: 
1. JURISDICTION. This is an action for specific performance of a real estate 
contract for the sale of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, with the Siggards 
asserting counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful lien, breach of 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations. Jurisdiction of the Court is thus invoked under Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-3-4 and is not disputed. The Court determined its jurisdiction to be present. 
2. VENUE. Venue is laid by CIC in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-13-1. The Court determined such venue to be proper. 
3. GENERAL NATURE OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS, 
(1) Commercial Investment Corporation's Claims: 
a. Breach of Contract. CIC has sued for breach of the Real Estate 
Contract, claiming the following breaches: Siggard declared the 
contract in default, having already breached the contract first and 
121647.3 2 
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without complying with the notice requirements of the contract; Siggard 
failed to timely provide an ALTA survey; Siggard refused to allow 
plaintiff to designate its desired acreage; and Siggard refused to honor 
the terms of the contract. CIC pleaded both rescission and specific 
performance as potential remedies for the alleged breach. 
b. Specific Performance. CIC pleaded as a separate cause of action 
Specific Performance of the contract based on the alleged breaches of 
contract by the defendants. CIC elected Specific Performance as its 
chosen remedy by motion to the court dated January 25, 1995. 
c. Relinquished Claims. 
(i) Unjust Enrichment. CIC alleged in count two of the First Amended 
Complaint that the Siggards were unjustly enriched by CIC's 
development efforts on the property including engineering, planning and 
the obtaining of commercial zoning for a portion of the property. CIC 
also alleged the Siggards were unjustly enriched by retaining their 
property without paying CIC adequate compensation. This claim was 
relinquished by CIC in its election of specific performance as its remedy 
in its motion and memorandum dated January 25, 1995. 
(ii) Rescission. CIC claimed it was entitled under the contract to 
rescind the contract and receive all payments made by CIC to Siggards 
121647.3 3 
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in the event of breach of the contract by the Siggards. This claim is 
also relinquished by CIC's election of specific performance as its 
remedy dated January 25, 1995. 
Siggards' Defenses: 
a. Breach of Contract 
(i) The Real Estate Contract is voidable for lack of consideration 
and is unconscionable. 
(ii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to 
designate property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by 
Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the 
Siggards' property. 
(iii) CIC's claim for specific performance fails because of CIC's 
failure to make a sufficient tender. 
(iv) CIC's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
(v) CIC failed to mitigate its alleged damages. 
(vi) CIC's claims are barred by waiver and estoppel in that CIC 
waived its right to claim a lack of a survey for its failure to designate 
the property to be surveyed. 
4 
ft A (\ Q « K 
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b. Unjust Enrichment 
(i) This claim is negated by virtue of CIC's election of specific 
performance of the contract as its chosen remedy. 
(ii) Siggards have not been enriched due to any act of CIC. 
c. Specific Performance 
(i) CIC has not tendered specific performance and is unable to 
tender specific performance. 
(ii) CIC has unclean hands. 
(iii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by 
failing to designate the property to be surveyed, thereby 
rendering performance by Siggards impossible, and by placing a 
Notice of Interest on the Siggards' property. 
d. Rescission 
(i) CIC's election of specific performance as its remedy negates this 
claim. 
(ii) CIC breached the contract by failing to make the down payment, 
by failing to make annual interest payments under its terms, by failing to 
designate the property to be surveyed, thereby rendering performance by 
121647.3 5 
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Siggards impossible, and by placing a Notice of Interest on the 
Siggards' property. 
Siggards' Counterclaims: 
a. Breach of Express Contract. CIC breached the express terms of the 
Real Estate Contract by failing to make required annual interest 
payments, failing to make the initial down payment, by failing to 
designate the property to be surveyed and encumbering the real property 
by filing a Notice of Interest on the subject property. 
b. Unjust Enrichment. CIC would be unjustly enriched if it received 
the property without making the down payment, without making the 
required interest payments and by encumbering all of the Siggards' 
property, despite having claim to only a portion of the subject property. 
CIC would also be unjustly enriched if it is allowed to receive the 
benefit of several years of unprecedented increase in the value of the 
land without making some reasonable compensation for such increase in 
the value of the land. 
c. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. CIC's 
failure to perform the contract, its refusal to designate the property to be 
surveyed and its very entering into the Real Estate Contract without the 
ability to perform the contract was in bad faith and constitutes a breach 
6 
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of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Real Estate 
Contract. 
d. Wrongful Lien. CIC's filing of a Notice of Interest encumbering the 
entire thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property while having a 
claim to only sixteen acres constitutes a wrongful lien on the Siggards' 
property. 
e. Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. CIC filed the 
Notice of Interest with the improper purpose, causing interference in the 
Siggards' prospective economic relations regarding the property. 
4. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by 
admissions in the pleadings or by stipulation of counsel: 
a. CIC is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
b. The Defendants Don and Glenna F. Siggard are trustees of the Don and 
Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, a beneficial trust created under the laws of Utah. 
c. At all times relevant to this action, Robert Busch was president of CIC. 
d. On August 31, 1989, the parties entered into a real estate contract (the 
"contract") for the sale and purchase of twenty (20) acres of a thirty-eight (38) acre parcel 
located in Sandy, Utah, owned by the Siggard Family Trust. 
121647.3 7 
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e. The contract required and acknowledged the deposit of a down payment 
by CIC to Landmark Title Company, although the actual payment of the down payment is 
disputed. 
f. The contract also required, among other things, that CIC make annual 
interest payments of ten percent (10%) per annum on the balance due to the Siggards on 
March 3 of each year until 1998, in the event the contract was not rescinded. 
g. The first annual interest payment was due March 3, 1989, unless the 
contract was rescinded. 
h. The Siggards did not receive the first annual interest payment on or 
before March 3, 1989. 
i. On March 5, 1989, the Siggards sent notice of default to CIC requiring 
CIC to make the payment within 30 days, and CIC received the notice. 
j . CIC paid the first annual interest payment of $56,000.00 on March 30, 
1989, within the required 30 days, after receiving notice of default. 
k. On March 30, 1989, the parties entered an Amendment to the Real 
Estate Contract, changing, among other things, the acreage to be sold and purchased from 
twenty (20) to sixteen (16) acres. 
1. On August 22, 1989, the Sandy City Commission entered Ordinance 
89-33 rezoning 10 acres of the Siggards' property to Special District Neighborhood 
Commercial (SD CN). 
121647 3 8 
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m. The Siggards did not obtain nor deliver a survey to CIC within 45 days 
of August 22, 1989, but did obtain and deliver a survey of the entire 38 acre parcel of 
property to CIC in June 1994. 
n. CIC did not pay, nor did the Siggards receive the annual interest 
payment that was due on March 3, 1990. 
o. On March 5, 1990, the Siggards mailed a notice of default of the 
contract to CIC; CIC received this notice on March 6, 1990. 
p. CIC did not make the annual interest payment. 
q. On April 3, 1990, the Siggards again notified CIC of its alleged default 
and its failure to cure, and declared themselves released of the obligations under the contract; 
CIC received this notice on April 3, 1990. 
r. On April 4, 1990, CIC filed a Notice of Interest claiming an interest in 
all thirty-eight (38) acres of the Siggards' property. 
s. On April 4, 1990, CIC sent a letter to the Siggards claiming default by 
the Siggards and demanding delivery of an ATLA survey and requiring proof of payment of 
taxes. 
t. CIC did not have, in 1990, nor has it ever had, a bank account in its 
name. 




a. Except as designated as uncontested above, all factual matters relevant 
to the questions of law or fact listed below. 
b. Who drafted the contract. 
c. Whether plaintiff made the down payment, and whether such payment 
was deposited with Landmark Title. 
d. Whether plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform the contract in 
1990, and today. 
e. Whether and when Siggards received notice of the rezoning of 10 acres. 
f. Whether the Siggards refused to allow CIC to designate the acres it 
would buy and otherwise refused to comply with the terms of the contract prior to March 3, 
1990. 
g. Whether Siggard complied with the forfeiture and notice provisions of 
the contract. 
h. Whether plaintiff has incurred any damages. 
L Whether CIC ever tendered its full performance of the contract. 
j . Whether CIC had, in 1990, or at any other time, any assets other than 
the Real Estate Contract. 
k. Whether CIC ever designated the property to be surveyed. 
6. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to 
those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are: 
121647.3 1 0 
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a. Whether the contract is enforceable. 
b. Whether Siggards breached the contract, and when. 
c. Whether encumbering all 38 acres of Siggards' property constitutes a 
wrongful lien. 
d. Whether CIC breached the contract. 
e. Whether CIC is entitled to specific performance, and if so, whether CIC 
owes any interest to date and whether the contract performance dates should be extended. 
f. Whether CIC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
g. Whether CIC tendered its full performance under the contract and 
whether CIC is excused from that tender. 
h. The measure of Siggards' damages, if any. 
i. Whether Siggard was required to comply with the forfeiture and notice 
provisions of the contract. 
j . Whether plaintiff intentionally interfered with Siggards' prospective 
economic relations. 
k. Whether CIC has the duty to mitigate when it is not seeking damages. 
1. Whether Siggards are entitled to attorneys' fees as a measure of their 
damages as a result of CIC's alleged breach of the contract and of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing or under any other statutory or legal basis. 
121647.3 1 1 
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7. EXHIBITS. The following documents are expected trial exhibits of the 
parties: 
a. The parties have agreed and stipulated to the admission of the exhibits 
as listed in the attached Trial Exhibit list. 
b. Plaintiffs' proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "A" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
c. Defendant's proposed trial exhibits are listed in Appendix "B" attached 
hereto and incorporated herein. 
d. The parties will file a stipulation as to which exhibits may be admitted 
into evidence within seven (7) days of trial. 
e. The parties shall exchange copies of their proposed trial exhibits within 
seven (7) days of trial. 
f. If other exhibits are to be offered and their necessity can be reasonably 
anticipated, they will be designated in a writing filed with the Court and submitted to 
opposing counsel at least three (3) days prior to trial. 
8. WITNESSES. Except with respect to rebuttal witnesses, if any: 
a. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary, 
CIC will call the following persons as witnesses: Bob Busch, Andrew Walton, Bailey 
Butters, the Siggards, Gary Free, Ken Dyer, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
CIC may call Greg Hales, Barbara Busch, and an engineer or surveyor. 
121647 3 1 2 
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CIC may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Bob Busch, Andy Walton, Mike 
Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
b. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary, 
defendants, the Siggards, will call the following persons as witnesses: Don and Glenna 
Siggard, Jeff Jensen, David Van Drimmelen, Michael Aldrich and Richard Sorensen. 
Defendants may call the following persons as witnesses: Mike Coulam, Mike Holmes and 
Gil Avillar. 
Defendants may use the depositions of Don Siggard, Andrew Walton, Robert 
Busch, Mike Coulam, George Shaw, and Gil Avillar. 
c. In the event other witnesses are to be called at trial, a statement of their 
names and addresses and the general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon 
opposing counsel at least seven (7) days prior to trial. This restriction shall not apply to 
rebuttal witnesses, the necessity of whose testimony reasonably cannot be anticipated before 
the time of trial. 
9. MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED. Prior to commencement of trial briefing, 
the following matters remain to be resolved by the court: 
a. Appraisals — to be exchanged by July 21, 1995. 
b. Motions in Limine — to be argued on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 a.m. 
10. REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS, Requests for voir dire examination of 
the jury and request for instructions to the jury shall be exchanged and submitted to the 
121647.3 13 
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Court by August 2, 1995. Counsel may supplement requested instructions during trial on 
matters that were not reasonably anticipated prior to trial. Proposed written questions for 
submission to the jury for the return of a special verdict, pursuant to Rule 49 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, shall be submitted to the Court at the same time as the request for 
instructions to the jury. 
11. AMENDMENTS TO THE PLEADINGS. The Court allowed CIC to amend 
the Complaint to add a claim for specific performance. CIC submitted its First Amended 
Complaint on July 30, 1993. 
12. DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed except for the interviewing or 
deposition of witnesses which must be completed by July 27, 1995. 
13. TRIAL SETTING. The case was set for a three-day jury trial to commence 
on August 1, 1995, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. at Room 301, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 




DATED this 3( f day of July, 1995. 
BY THE COU 
The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
Prior to execution by the Court, the foregoing Pretrial Order is hereby adopted this 
day of July, 1995. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
;s L. Christensen 
irneys for Plaintiff 
Commercial Investment Corporation 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Randall N.llcarichy-^ 
Scott D. Cheney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Don and Glenna F. Siggard 
121647.3 15 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'•>•• I hereby certify that on the y{" day of July, 1995, I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PRETRIAL ORDER to: 
James L. Christensen 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
121647.3 16 
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TRIAL EXHIBIT INDEX 
1. Earnest Money Sales Agreement, March 3, 1988. 
2. Promissory Note, March 3, 1988. 
3. Site Plan (Exhibit A), April 19, 1988. 
4. Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, April 20, 1988 with 
accompanying letter of April 20, 1988, property plat, legal description. 
5. Commitment for Title Insurance, June 7, 1988. 
6. Amended Commitment for Title Insurance, August 31, 1988. 
7. Real Estate Contract, August 31, 1988. 
8. Site Plan, November 8, 1988. 
9. Letter to Allen McCandless from Bailey Butters, dated November 22, 1988. 
10. Memo from Planning Department to Planning Commission and City Council, dated 
November 23, 1988. 
11. Sandy City Zone change documents (See Appendix A-1, 57 separate documents). 
12. February 1989 Busch Comments with Regard to Stipulations from Crescent Village 
Citizens Committee. 
13. Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-2, #89-33, January 10, 1989. 
14. Sandy City Zoning Ordinance #89-33. 
15. § 15-29-27, Sandy City Development Code. 
16. Notice of Buyer's Default, March 6, 1989. 
17. Amendment to Real Estate Contract, March 30, 1989. 
18. $56,000 check stub of Busch Properties, Inc. dated March 30, 1989. 
121647.3 17 
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19. Memo from Phil Glenn to Councilmen, Andy Walton and others, dated June 15, 
1989. 
20. Notice of Buyers Default, March 5, 1990 and certified mail return receipts. 
21. Notice of Forfeiture of Buyers, April 3, 1990 and certified mail return receipts. 
22. Notice of Interest, April 4, 1990. 
23. Letter to Siggards from Christensen, April 4, 1990. 
24. Handwritten note of Don Siggard, April 22, 1992. 
25. Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Woodside Homes, Inc., September 14, 
1992. 
26. Earnest Money Sales Agreement from Perry & Associates, Inc., December 10, 
1992. 
27. December 7, 1993 Letter from Michael L. Aldrich to Randy Coke. 
28. Sorensen ALTA Property Survey, June, 1994. 
29. Drawings of legal descriptions for zoned property: April 20, 1988, November 8, 
1988, Ordinance 89-33, Site Plan 1994. 
30. CIC Appraisals. 
31. Siggard Appraisal. 
32. Site Plan Review Chapter 15-22 Site Plan Review. 
33. Time Line of Events. 
34. Property Tax Evaluations for 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. 
35. Planning Commission Application dated September 20, 1994. 
36. Sandy City Site Plan Review Procedures and Standards. 




PLAINTIFFS ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS 
1. CIC Timeline. 
2. Aerial Photograph of Property. 
3. Cash Receipts #310916 and 310917 dated September 20, 1994. 
4. Subdivision or Site Plan Review Fees Form, September 14, 1994. 
5. Application for Conditional Use Permit, September 20, 1994. 
6. Update Market Analysis for Retail/Commercial Development - 11300 South 1000 
East for Gardner and Associates by Leffler & Associates, September, 1994. 
7. Letter to Sandy City Planning Commission from Bill Peperone, September 20, 
1994. 
8. Legal Description. 
9. Letter to Sandy City Planning Department from Commercial Investment Corp., 
September 29, 1994. 
10. Letter to Sandy City from Commercial Investment Corp., October 3, 1994. 
11. Memorandum to Greg Hales from Bill Peperone, October 3, 1994. 
12. Memorandum of Kathy Jeffery, Deputy City Attorney from Bill Peperone, 
October 25, 1994. 
13. Sandy City Meeting Minutes, October 25, 1994. 
14. Commitment for Title Insurance, January 30, 1995. 
15. Certificate of Deposit for $56,000 in the name of Commercial Investment 
Corporation. 
121647.3 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFENDANTS' ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS 
September 8, 1992 letter from Randy Coke to Jim Christensen. 
September 14, 1994 letter to Jim Christensen from Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0 0 0 4 A 
In order to forfeit a purchaser's interest under a reai estate contract, the seller must 
comply strictly with the notice provisions of the contract. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 43 0 0 0 4 1 
WRONGFUL LIEN - GROUNDLESS 
The wrongful lien statute provides that a person who files a document can be held liable 
for a wrongful lien if the person knows or haSv reason to know that the document is 
"groundless". 
A document is groundless only if the interest claimed in the document has no arguable 
basis or is not supported by any credible evidence. 
0 0 1 a * 
IN l l i i 'THIRD IIIDH IAI IHSTMCI HHIIM' 
r. \ • ' , 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
_ _ U& '•:'''"<. 
)MMERC * '• ^ * | . ' N T TORI 
Plaintiff, SPECIAL VERDICT 
vs.. : 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. : Case No. 920904431CV 
SIGGARD, as "Trustees for the Don Siggard: 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Tin ist. : .Judge Glenn K Iwasaki 
Defendants : 
MEMBERS i I- Mil (URV 
Please answer 'the following questions based on your determination of whether the fact 
in question has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. If you . that the 
evidence si lpports a gn e n fact 1: •] a preponderance > c i i should answer the questions as to that 
"Yes " If, on the other hand, if you find that the evidence as to a given fact is so equally 
balantt'tl lllial I,IIII i .IIIIIIIIIIIIII I ilctnmini1 Ilk pi^pondtrana1 nl lb; i \ idenu m ill ' m Illiiiiiiil! llli.ii line 
evidence preponderates against the fact presented, answer the question as to that fact • " 
Some questions have already been niailed foi you based upon Hie stipulation of the panics.. 
1. tVas the contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the Siggards 
a valid contract? 
_ I ,l" "i: s No 
133425J 
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2. Did Commercial Investment Corporation fail to fully tender its performance 
and perform all of its contractual obligations according to the terms of the Contract including 
the timely payment of all amounts due? 
X Yes Na 
3. Was Commercial Investment Corporation excused from tendering its 
performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual interest 
payment obligations? 
Yes \ No , v 
4. Is Commercial Investment Corporation/precluded} from asserting that it is 
excused from failing to perform its obligations by any one of the following: a) estoppel,b ) 
waiver, and/or c) unclean hands? 
5. Is Commercial Investment Corporation entitled to specific performance of the 
Real Estate Contract? 
Yes J ( N o 
6. Did the Siggards perform all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial Investment 
Corporation's interest in the contract? 
JL Yes No 
7. Was the Notice of Interest filed by Commercial Investment Corporation in 
violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute? 
_X Yes N° 
8. Did Commercial Investment Corporation breach the Real Estate Contract? 
2 1 Yes No 
133425.1 
0 0 1 ft 0 A 
00047 
A
 Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being 
* "mey would 
fairly and adequately compensate the Siggards for actual damages suffered by them proximately 
caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest? 
Amount: "|i / '"" 
The foregoing answers agreed upon, signed and returned to the Court this j ^ _ ^ _ day 
)&L*u^1 Tj^c OAJ 
person 
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Randall N. Skanchy (USB #2968) 
Scott D. Cheney (USB #6198) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna F. Siggard 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT CORP. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON SIGGARD AND GLENNA F. 
SIGGARD, as Trustees for the Don Siggard 
and Glenna F. Siggard Family Trust, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT T V " ~Vv *V->-' *v,"^-< <5c. 
Case No. 920904431CV 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment is hereby 
entered upon the verdict of the jury, the trial of this matter having come before the Court on 
Tuesday, August 1, 1995, for jury trial, the jury being duly constituted and the trial proceeding 
August 1, 2, 3 and 4, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Commercial Investment Corporation 
having been represented by James L. Christensen and Mark J. Morrise of the law firm 
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, and defendants and counterclaim plaintiffs Don Siggard and 
134285 3 
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Glenna F. Siggard, as Trustees for the Don Siggard ..* Siggard Family "1'rust 
("Siggards"), ti'i\'iiit» bn/iiii ir|iirs(Mited by Randall N Skanch] and Scott I). Cheney of the law 
firm ol Jones, Waldo Holbrook & McDonough. The jurv, having carefully considered the 
evidence, the testimon vilnesses, aiguiiiuil Iby * niinsol Jiud luiviiijj, iiieecivcd I; • s, 
jury instructions, and the special verdict, and the Court having received the jury's completed 
special verdict which found as follows: 
... (i) I he contract between Commercial Investment Corporation and the 
Siggards was a \a- o ..oniracf (This finding was stipulated to by the parties prior to 
submission 
(ii) mestment Corporation 'failed to fully tender its 
performance am. . . ....i;., . ... contractual obligations according to the terms of 
the Contract including the timely payments of all amounts due (this finding was 
stipulated, to by the parties prior to submission to the jury); and 
(1111 I 'oiiiiiicn ml l i i " i ' i t im ill Corpnul io i i "> 1 11 >l i'M IISMI f ioi i i 11 *fuIc 1111"• 
its performance and from performing its contractual obligations including its annual 
interest pa>i ., .,;,.:.;., and 
(u wiwial Investment Corporation is not allowed to assert; that it was 
excused from failii ig to perh-rn , obligations by any one of the following: 
a) estoppel. ' — • . ! in hands. 
iurcu : imestmeni 1 Mporaiii \ not' eruided -
perf*-;,, JJ. 
134285.3 ' 2 
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(vi) The Siggards performed all steps necessary to forfeit Commercial 
Investment Corporation's interest in the contract; and 
(vii) The Notice of Interest was filed by Commercial Investment Corporation 
in violation of Utah Wrongful Lien Statute; and 
(viii) Commercial Investment Corporation breached the Real Estate Contract; 
and 
(ix) Considering only the evidence concerning damages, and without being 
concerned with the fault of any party in answering this question, what amount of 
money would fairly and accurately compensate the Siggards for actual damages 
suffered by them proximately caused by the filing of the Notice of Interest? 
Amount: $ -0-
Based upon the findings of the jury and the stipulations of the parties, the Court enters 
the following Judgment: 
1. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for Specific Performance is dismissed with 
prejudice; 
2. Siggards' Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing are hereby granted, the Real Estate Contract is hereby made null and 
void, and Commercial Investment Corporation's interest in any and all real property under the 
Real Estate Contract is forfeited; and 
3. Siggards' Counterclaim for Wrongful Lien, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-1 
is hereby granted and, because no actual damages were offered at trial or found by the jury, the 
134285 3 3 
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statutory penalty of $1,000 Is hereby entered of record, with a memorandum of costs and 
DATED this / ( / day of August, 1995. 
^Tlonorable Glenn,,, K Iwas, 
District Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
HIRBRlDGh, BAIRD & ( iIKISTHNSI-iN 
By. 
James L. Christensen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendant 
Commercial Investment Corporation 
JONES, WAT JV ", ! V M HUC H )K ,V M,- i M W )\ '< III 
B y _ 
Randall N. Skanchy 
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs Don and Glenna " \\vsdut ,^ 
Trustees of the Don Sigurd and (Henna P. 
Siggard Family Tn,c' 
134285.3 4 
